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Edelenyi: Modern Skepticism: The Crisis of Truth

The Crisis of Truth

Rev. Achilles Edelenyi
The present philosophical and historical study is an analysis of some segments of
intellectual life of the modern era, pointing out the factors which contributed to the crisis
or even disintegration of truth, raising simultaneously the question whether truth and its
universal validity still could be vindicated.
Truth always has been problematical. Greek antiquity with its sceptics simply denied
the possibility of knowing it with certitude. The thinkers of the Middle Ages, however,
following the epistemological guidelines of St. Augustine, which he laid down in his work
against the sceptics of his day, were certain about the possibility of knowing it. Its
universal validity was never questioned. Neither was doubt ever raised about the existence
of the world outside of the knowing subject. The capability of human cognitive faculties
was equally recognized as an established fact.
This picture of intellectual security was completely changed with the appearance of
the late scholastic, William Ockham. He raised many problems concerning truth and
certitude when he rejected the universals as untrustworthy. Ockham doubted whether
universal concepts gained through abstraction would be able to supply that which
previous philosophers had expected from them, namely the illumination of the innermost
constitution of things that would reproduce their intrinsic nature. 1 Thus the universal is
nothing for him but an object of thought; it has no ontological relevance: "The universal
is only in the soul and therefore it is not in things.,, 2
By this latter statement the basic possibility of the cognition of truth was destroyed.
Indeed, if the universals are nothing but names, lacking all objective value, there is no way
to know the truth about the external world around us, and much less are we able to know
the truth of a higher order toward which the material world is pointing. Ockham's
scepticism became widespread in the following centuries until Montaigne and Charron
openly declared that the only reliable source of certitude and truth is faith.
Descartes inaugurated a new approach to the question of rational certitude in the
seventeenth century. According to Hirschberger's understanding of Heidegger,3 the whole
of modern metaphysics, Nietzsche included, followed the interpretation of being and
truth which had been traced by Descartes. Since Descartes' time, philosophical thinking
has been searching for a reliable foundation of truth. The question is not the falsely
posited problem whether there is an external world around us, although the real question
is disguised sometimes in this manner. Rather the last, dependable foundation is sought,
which would destroy all doubts, and upon which the house of truth and so the sense of
human life could be built. The problem rests concerning the meaning of the knowledge of
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the truth for the whole of human life. The restlessness became more acute in the course
of the centuries since the foundation could not be found in God, as it was the case in the
Middle Ages, because the existence of God was doubted, or even denied. Thus truth
became a matter of the autonomous man; and so was the sense of human life. This slowly
developed and basic subjectivism justifies somewhat the ominous vision: The modern
man - i.e. , the man since the Renaissance - is ready to be buried. 4
Following the period after Descartes, the task of finding a new foundation for truth
did not seem to be difficult. With Newton came the new science of nature with its
unchangeable and generally valid laws. To doubt the new science seemed to be
impossible. Besides, the results for humanity were extremely beneficial. Poverty and
illness were easily overcome; the powers of nature entered the service of man. Scientific
progress seemed to permit man to become the master of nature and of himself. The
utopia of a paradise on earth appeared to be a future possibility. To serve this progress
and to accelerate it were considered the most worthy goals of life.
It was assumed that truth itself will benefit from this development of things.
Futhermore, it was believed that the long sought after foundation of truth was at hand.
The solid experimental presence of the matter vindicated itself by technical success as a
result of the new science. Experimental reality became the defense lawyer of truth and
made all arguing futile. There was no doubt that in the natural sciences as well as in
mathematical deductions, detailed knowledge is cogent.
The late medieval quarrel in metaphysics which brought the subject into ill repute was
impossible in the natural sciences. In contrast to them it was held that the basis of
metaphysics was not solid and dependable. This was the picture when Kant S tried to
change the method of metaphysics according to the example of geometry and natural
sciences. He attempted a complete, as he called it, Copernican revolution in epistemology,
giving what he considered a new and more solid foundation to metaphysics. Kant was
convinced that the new scientific method is equally valid at the philosophical level and
that man is able to produce his knowledge as well as he can fabricate his tools. His
intention was to examine the conditions of knowledge, but doing this he overlooked the
fact that he had to deal with the very same knowledge, the reliability of which he
doubted. The result of his examination was that objective knowledge could not reach
beyond the phenomenal. Kant totally misunderstood the often repeated Scholastic
principle that nothing is in the intellect which was not earlier in the senses. Therefore,
when he noticed that there is no such thing as purely intellectual contemplation, he
thought that the insight into the essence of things is unreal. Thus the knowledge of truth
remains for him on the surface; i.e. , only the phenomena, the appearances of things are
really known, not their essences. But if this is the case, then we have real insight only in
ourselves, diverting his philosophy into solipsism. Kant was never conscious of this
consequence.
Solipsism makes man depend completely upon himself. The world becomes his palace
without doors. If the existence of other men is still presupposed or even justified, this
happens in contradicition to his own suppositions. Such presupposition proves only that
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it is senseless to deny the existence of other individuals, or just or admit their existence,
because our own ego exists. According to Kant and the phenomenologist E. Husserl who
continued Kant's line of thought, we encounter in other people only ourselves, because
we posit our own intellectuality in the perceived bodies of others which are only
phenomena. But in this way the human mind becomes blind; it does not possess the gift
of intuition into foreign intellectuality. Consequently, God himself must disappear from
view, for in the world of perception He does not have his place as the bodies of other men
do. For a solipsist it is impossible to go beyond this world; the Kantian categories of the
mind have to run empty when they try to vindicate the existence of God, since we do not
have sense impressions from God which would make their activity valid. Thus God
becomes an idea for Kant; for Husserl He is "the endlessly faraway man.,,6
At this stage of historical aevelopment, when it was realized that the last foundation
of truth can only be man himself, attempts have never ceased in searching for a
dependable foundation. The systems of German Idealism following the era of Kant are
well known. Their development has shown that man is not something univocal. Man was
for Fichte the moral act positing himself, for Schelling he was the artistically creative and
religious person and for Hegel he was the logical movement of the opposites. In Husserl's
phenomenology we experience the limitation of the human mind to the natural sciences.
Founded on the idea that man is the ultimate foundation of truth, man's historicity
was philosophically discovered. For Kant it was natural to suppose that the categories of
the mind will remain the same forever, a supposition which was not adequately proved.
Thus the question came up whether historical evolution which is characteristic for
everything human would not change the categories. It is just logical that if the entire man
is changeable, then with his changing categories truth itself has to change. M. Heidegger
thinks that Aristotelian physics was true in his time; today, however, it is false'? The
reason he gives is the Greek view of the essence of bodies and place. From the modern
point of view, the relation of both is different and so is the interpretation of nature.
Therefore it supposes a correspondingly different way of seeing and thinking in regard to
natural processes. If this reasoning of Heidegger is correct, then what could truth mean
which is subject to the laws of change? It certainly has lost the conventional meaning and
has ceased to be truth in the strict sense.
Indeed, the historical understanding of man is very questionable. If man is unable to
think beyond his own categories, implying that peoples of bygone eras were thinking in
different categories from ours, then their world cannot be reconstructed as it really was.
Every interpretation of Zeno, for example, would not render his ideas to us but only their
interpretation and respectively the misinterpretation of the interpreter who is using his
own contemporary categories while thinking. Thus the essential extension of man's
understanding of himself becomes impossible. This way man does not have an access to
his own past. His existence shrinks down to one point, namely to his present. He becomes
similar to matter, becoming an object of the natural sciences. Our rational nature
nevertheless requires that man lives in the unity of past, present and future. If one of
these extensions is mutilated, all of them will suffer by it, resulting in the contemporary
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outlook that man is only the man of the present.
The historical outlook unfolds the contemporary man as he really is; the man who
exhausts himself in technical matters, in econimics; the man without living traditions; the
unstable and restless man; the man who does not have a fum hold on himself. Man's
technological success by its very nature makes the pursuit of metaphysical certainly not
only impossible, but irrelevant. Consequently, truth has to be different for each
individual, since people are different, making the basis of mutual understanding
increasingly difficult. Indeed, the sum of truths which is still common to everybody,
upon which everybody can draw, direct himself, and rely on, is defmitely decreasing.
The collapse of Idealism, responsible partially for the decline of truth, was inevitable
when it became evident that man is not something completely intellectual in the way seen
by the Idealists. As a reaction to Idealism, other ideas with their central notions on life
and personal experience were emphasized by the Romantics. Was truth the work of man,
asked the Romantics, that it can be traced back to some irrational forces? They saw it
already that psychic life in man follows its own laws and impulses, emotions and other
features which resist every illumination from the spirit and very often overrule it. 8
Feelings and prejudices strongly influence the judgment about persons and things. It is
generally accepted, that passions are the driving force of history. This means that man is
primarily a psycho-biological animation. The spirit seems to be only a tool in the service
of such an animation. Can this outlook be a basis for the foundation of truth? In this way
we reach the logical conclusion bluntly and repeatedly expressed by Nietzsche: 9 that
truth is nothing but a disguise of the will to power. This speaks for itself clearly; there is
no such thing as objective truth!
The philosophy of life with its central idea of man as a biological animation, leaves
neither room for the spiritual, nor for truth, error, moral good or evil. Desires and
passions are its ruling elements. They try to assert themselves, and the stronger passions
suppress the weaker ones so that animality prevails in man . An animal never will ask what
is true or false, good or evil. It simply lives, led and driven by its instincts, by the demands
of physical comfort. Its perception is focused on the distinction between what promotes
or harms its life; to obtain the first and flee the latter. But what is beneficial and what is
harmful, are different for each species. Applying this philosophy to man, truth becomes
something relative. It would definitely not lead man to the knowledge of the thing as it is
in itself, just to use the well-known Kantian phrase. Consequently, communication would
be impossible, and the community would turn into a herd. The same would happen as it
does to animals which do not have the fruits of communication, namely, culture. No
animal does ever raise the question: What does the other think, next to him? What are his
ambitions? Each animal lives closed in upon itself and only the common instinct keeps
the herd together. Real human existence would not be possible any longer, since survival
would be the sole purpose of man's existence. All that would remain, would be the
herdlike existence of the collective, the leaders of which would not be led less than the
rest; the only distinctive quality would be their more conspicuous brutality. What we call
truth would be replaced by force and power in the struggle for survival and self-assertion.
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The sense of life, why one wants to assert himself, would be completely lacking. Man
would live for living itself, like an animal. The final purpose of life would be death.
Since the time of Nietzsche man's outlook on life has changed considerably. This
change started already while he was still living. He, himself, however, did not notice it.
Human life always needed the economy for its foundation. In past centuries, the
foundation was based on products derived from animal and plant life. The economy was
not of primary importance, as long as it adjusted itself to plant and animal life.
A complete change took place in this respect with the appearance of the technological
age, conditioned by the natural sciences. This age widened the foundations of human
existence to undreamed horizons and increased the possibilities and duration of life itself.
In technical matters man experiences himself as the creating individual who produces his
world around himself. Kant's Copernican revolution of cognition was no th~ory here, but
an established fact. The creating power of the cognitive categories was applied to the
external world, and thus transformed almost every aspect of human life. Marx, qualifying
himself as a topsy-turvy Hegelian, 1 0 misinterpreted Hegel when he stated that the
economy is the most fundamental element in man's existence. According to Marx and
Engels man is what the economy makes of him. Knowledge stands in the service of
transformation of the world of man and thus of man himself. Knowledge is true if it
stimulates and promotes progress ; it is false, holding it back. Although progress cannot be
calculated mathematically, nevertheless, it can be foreseen and predicted with certainty as
soon as the essential features of the economy are understood.
Technology, basically, is a power. Stones are not asked to come together to form an
edifice; they are brought to the place where they should be. Raw materials are worked
upon with fire, pressure and chemicals until they become useful for human purposes.
Machines are driven and not persuaded to run. Consequently, if force is the formative
factor of man's world, it should be the tool to give shape to man and make him the man
of the future. Thus, Marxism and communism are faithful to their last and profound
principles when they force man to his happiness.
Technics deals with matter. The role of man is to make active the laws of nature in the
proper place and under the proper conditions. But in this way the creative power of man,
marvelously effective in technical matters, proves itself to be specifically limited and
metaphysically meaningless. It can produce nothing immediately; it cannot change and
transform the essence of what is material. The influence of technics remains on the
surface of the being. It creates nothing in a metaphysical sense.
Therefore, it becomes clear, that matter, insofar as it can reveal itself to us, is inferior
to biological life. Matter only exists, there is no order or finality in matter, by which it
may be judged. Order is created only by the spirit and to a lower degree by that which is
alive. If somebody cannot accept order born of the spiritual and intellectual, he has to
believe in force and coercion as ties to keep men together. Force, however, subordinates
man to an alien will, not because he sees the goodness of what is ordered, but because the
other is stronger. But man under such coercion is no longer really himself. Therefore his
forced happiness is a false happiness, because man either feels too much coercion or he
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has been brainwashed into submissiveness. Marxism with its claim of the classless society
means a society in which all classes disappeared in the Gleichschaltung; i.e., in the
levelling of a society of slaves and robots.
It would be a vain attempt to expect a total transformation of man by economic
structures or technological progress. As we have seen, technological progress cannot
change matter itself, only its destination to spatial relations. The only transformation
possibly gained by technics is the complete subordination of man to its powers, creating,
so to say, a state of unfree men. Should communism ever succeed in creating favorable
economic conditions, the question would immediately arise regarding the meaning of
economy and the meaning of life itself. Since communism is unable to answer these
questions adequately, these questions could mean its downfall. Economic well-being is a
mortal danger for communism. This latter brings up the question of truth in its entire
sharpness and non-compromising necessity, which men under the pressure of hunger are
not disposed to consider. Reports indicate that the younger generation in Russia - and this
is even more the case in the satellite countries like Czechoslovakia and Rumania - is losing
its interest in communistic ideals. The question is: Why should one live under force and
coercion now, in order that future generations may have better times? This question
cannot be answered by Marxism. While Marxism expects the spirit of courage and
sacrifice from the people, it then turns against its own principles somewhat as it appeals
to the freedom of the individual to fight for communism.
Communism and correlated systems commit a fatal mistake in teaching relativism and
changeability of truth. If the spirit of man is only a by-product of the forms of
production and truth changes with them, then the same thing is valid about the system
and edifice of communism. The economy of the world has changed considerably since the
time of Marx and it is today totally different even in capitalistic countries. If we admit
that the teachings of Marxism were correct at his time, this is not the case any longer
according to its own principles of change. Or should Marxism be an exception? Well, if it
were an exception, then Marxism is not based upon a strict law. And we know that one
exception is sufficient to prove that a supposed natural law is false. Furthermore, all laws
recognized by Marxism are natural laws which form the basis of all sciences.
Consequently, the truth of communism is not more reliable than the truth of the other
systems condemned by communism. And since for communism tru th is only that which
is material, thus truth is virtually nonexistent. Its truth slogan is used only as a tool to
consolidate power over the enslaved masses.
The entire history of thought since Descartes has been an attempt to make man the
foundation of truth and so an absolute master over himself. God and nature, right and
morals, the arts and the sciences were recognized as the reality; value and category
systems are understood by man as he created them.1 1 By giving himself truth, man
creates his intellectual world. Thus nothing should stand above him, everything is only a
reflection of his essence. But this attitude is the destruction of tru th , because the essence
of truth is universal validity, not something created by man, but preceding and extrinsic
to him, otherwise it is no truth at all. By following this path, man did not succeed in
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solving the enigma of reality and of himself. An observation of Sartre may somewhat
illustrate the situation. "Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is
in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or
outside himself.,,12
The illusion still remained, that after having conquered the forces of nature, man will
conquer himself and thus direct his own destiny. Exactly the opposite happened. The
more man became master of nature, the more he lost himself; and while he was losing
himself, he was exposed to forces without name and face. It had to be that way. The
better man understood the different layers of reality which were other than non-material
and personal nature, the more he conceded to be a product of material forces prevailing
in technics and economics which necessarily proceed according to unchangeable natural
laws. These forces, however, have no power to control themselves. How should then man
be able to control himself when he is nothing but the product of these forces? Whenever
he thinks that he is pushing, actually he is the one shoved.
Whenever technks and economics mean the highest and most decisive values for man,
then their pressure becomes so overwhelming that he is unable to accept the fact that in
him there is a specific power, an immaterial substance which is not simply subject to laws
prevailing in these spheres of activity. Therefore, his decisions are often made in the
subconscious, conditioned by the same laws. But, not having a firm hold on himself, even
those laws which he considers supreme become his adversaries. Technics and economics
grow over his head and often lead him with their laws to some place where he actually
does not want to go. Thus man becomes a slave of his own m astery over nature. And
declaring himself the absolute and last instance of tru th, he is not more in his own
estimation than a superior animal, a necessary result of economic processes and forms, a
senseless product of senseless historical happenings. Making himself absolute and
supreme, we would expect that a remarkable fact would originate from this absoluteness
of the human reason; a titanic humanity would be created. This latter , however , takes
place only in a very few cases and usually it is followed by a pitiful collapse as we have
learned it; e.g., from Germany's downfall in World War II. It is a consequence of the
apparent contradiction which is between man 's certitude about scientific knowledge of
nature and his lack of orientation about the meaning of life .
The new line which started with Descartes in the search for the foundation of
certitude and tru th ended in failure. Kan tian idealism, historical understanding,
philosophy of life, and finally the philosophy of Marxism indicate that man in his search
for a solid foundation of certitude and truth is no closer to it than was the era of
Descartes, Montaigne and Charron.
If there is a chance to terminate this development and vindicate truth , the answer lies
in the reversal of the course started by Descartes.
When man closes the windows of intellectual sight around himself in order to rely
entirely upon himself, as Descartes did for the first time, actually he is denying his
rational nature which wants to have unlimited intellectual horizons. This fact points
toward one definite conclusion; man must remain open. And he is open, if he recognizes
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other men in their humanity, equally as himself, not only as phenomenal representatives
of the economy, technicians, political opponents or allies, but also as humans, rational
beings whose access to truth and knowledge equals his own. Here lies the key to the
vindication of truth.
In a brother human being, endowed with personality, man encounters reality which is
independent from the knower who according to Kant, creates reality. The recognition of
a fellow man in his historical uniqueness includes recognition of him as a being endowed
with mind, like ourselves. This communication of intellectuality with other human beings
is the immediate vindication of truth. Modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant
neglected this first and most essential of all in sigh ts, instead of making it the first
epistemological starting point. All later attempts to know alien intellectuality have been
frustrated and could not eliminate solipsism which became a heritage of the neo-Kantian
school. 13 The Kantian line presupposed the existence of other men without subjecting
this datum to philosophical scrutiny. Human intercommunication is metaphysically
simultaneous and equivalent with being itself, and participates in the intellectual
consciousness of the others. Intercommunication excludes extreme individualism as well
as collectivism as contrary to the true nature of man. If these facts are misjudged, there is
no way to find a solid foundation of truth. In intercommunication with others we find it
reconfirmed that truth is still the same as Aristitle once defined it; "Truth is a statement
of that which is that it is, or of that which is not that it is not. ,,14 Using this timeless
definition of the Stagirite, we understand why nobody considers himself as a
phenomenon formed by the categories of another individual or as a product of
impersonal forces, conditioned by nature. The truth of human cognition is oriented
according to what is in reality and not according to subjective consideration.
Philosophies of the past centuries examined in this study failed to find the foundation
of truth in personal intercommunication. And since what is personal in man cannot be
deduced or explained from something impersonal, therefore we have a final conslusion:
The ultimate source of truth must be a supreme personal Being!
Nevertheless, there is an explanation for the titanic attempt to make man the ultimate
source of truth. Earlier ages interpreted the material world according to their spiritual
standards. In this consideration everything was full of meaning. With the arrival of the
natural sciences this view disappeared. Looking for sense and tru th, modern man
depended upon himself and, having achieved mastery over nature through the sciences,
proved himself creative through his technical abilities. It was grossly overlooked that this
mastery was very external and that the creative elemen t was located only on the surface of
the matter. It was similarly overlooked that the in sigh t conveyed by natural sciences which
became the proper access to reality comprehended only quantitative and measurable
relations. The essence of the matter, as it is in itself, to say a farewell to Kant, remained
hidden, as it was before the arrival of the technological age. Actually, man with his
putative creativeness entered the service of corporeal welfare, thus subordinating his spirit
to material life and losing sight of his proper position in the hierarchy of beings. What is
corporeal and biological, has no relation to truth proper but only to what is useful or
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harmful. Therefore, every attempt had to collapse which wanted to build the edifice of
truth upon the putatively creative in man. Truth is not a construction as it was
understood by Kant under the influence of the oncoming technological age. I t is rather a
recognition of reality attained by the human spirit.
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